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Linux Kernel Out-of-Bounds Write Vulnerability

Exploited · KEV 2026-09-18CVE-2026-53266CWE-787

Exploited since 2026-09-18. No WAF vendor names it yet.

Edge rules
0/8
Our test
No exploit yet
CVSS
8.8
EPSS
0.9% Top 39%
Posts, 14d
02026-10-21: 0 posts2026-10-22: 0 posts2026-10-23: 0 posts2026-10-24: 0 posts2026-10-25: 0 posts2026-10-26: 0 posts2026-10-27: 0 posts2026-10-28: 0 posts2026-10-29: 0 posts2026-10-30: 0 posts2026-10-31: 0 posts2026-11-01: 0 posts2026-11-02: 0 posts2026-11-03: 0 posts
Published
2026-06-25
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0). This is… More

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0). This is intentional: at the bridge ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb->data points at the Ethernet payload. Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a. However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different. It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb->data: skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info->mac, ETH_ALEN) skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make the later sender hardware address range writable. If that range is still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address directly into it. Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and before calling skb_store_bits().

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Ask about CVE-2026-53266: who's covered, what to patch first, how vendors compare. I cite sources and won't help with attacks.

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Severity, decoded

CVSS 3.1
High · 8.8 / 10

Exploitable with local access, with low privileges and no user interaction, leading to full loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability, and the impact can reach components beyond the vulnerable one.

Needs local accessAny user loginNo user actionWorks reliablySpreads beyond the appFull compromise
How the score is built8 metrics
  • Attack vectorAn attacker needs local access, or must trick a user into opening something on the machine.
    Local
  • Attack complexityNo special conditions are needed; the attack works reliably.
    Low
  • Privileges requiredThe attacker needs an ordinary user account.
    Low
  • User interactionNo one has to click or open anything; the attack works on its own.
    None
  • ScopeThe attack can spread beyond the vulnerable component to other parts of the system.
    Changed
  • Confidentiality impactAn attacker can read all data the affected component holds, or the most sensitive parts of it.
    High
  • Integrity impactAn attacker can change any data or files the affected component protects.
    High
  • Availability impactAn attacker can take the component down completely or keep it from serving anyone.
    High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CISA's assessmentSSVC, from the CVE record
ExploitationActive

Attackers are exploiting this in the wild.

AutomatableNo

At least one step needs hands-on work, which slows mass attacks.

Technical impactTotal

A successful attack gives full control over the affected software or all of its data.

Public exploits

None found
0 Metasploit0 Exploit-DB0 Scanner template0 GitHub PoCs

No exploit in Exploit-DB or Metasploit, and no scanner template. That lowers, but doesn't remove, the chance of mass exploitation.

Timeline

  1. 2026-06-25
    CVE published
    CVE List
  2. 2026-09-18
    Added to CISA KEV
    Confirmed exploitation in the wild

Social

2026-10-21: 0 posts2026-10-22: 0 posts2026-10-23: 0 posts2026-10-24: 0 posts2026-10-25: 0 posts2026-10-26: 0 posts2026-10-27: 0 posts2026-10-28: 0 posts2026-10-29: 0 posts2026-10-30: 0 posts2026-10-31: 0 posts2026-11-01: 0 posts2026-11-02: 0 posts2026-11-03: 0 posts

No posts seen yet on X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Hacker News or GitHub.

Vendor statements

Quoted
CloudflareWAF Managed RulesNo public claim

We found no public statement from this vendor naming this CVE. That is not proof of no protection: generic rules may still catch it. Each row gives the rule ID and its default action. The feed starts in January 2025, so older rules are missing.

AWSAWS WAF Managed RulesNo public claim

We found no public statement from this vendor naming this CVE. That is not proof of no protection: generic rules may still catch it. AWS often describes a vulnerability without naming its CVE (for example "Log4j"). We count only entries that name the CVE, so AWS coverage is understated.

Microsoft AzureFront Door and Application Gateway WAF (DRS)No public claim

We found no public statement from this vendor naming this CVE. That is not proof of no protection: generic rules may still catch it. The rule tables name CVEs but carry no dates, so Azure is left out of every time-to-rule figure.

Google CloudCloud Armor preconfigured WAF rulesNo public claim

We found no public statement from this vendor naming this CVE. That is not proof of no protection: generic rules may still catch it. Google names few CVEs: the release notes start in May 2024 and the rules reference lists CVEs without dates. Its cve-canary rules are opt-in.

FastlyNext-Gen WAF virtual patchesBefore feed history

The CVE predates the oldest entry in this vendor's public feed, so a rule may exist that we cannot see.

F5Attack signatures (Distributed Cloud WAF)No public claim

We found no public statement from this vendor naming this CVE. That is not proof of no protection: generic rules may still catch it. Each signature lists the CVEs it references, with its id and date. F5 does not state a default action; signatures enforce once staging ends in your policy.

AkamaiApp & API Protector (Adaptive Security Engine)No public source

This vendor publishes no machine-readable rule changelog we can check.

OWASP CRSCore Rule Set (open source, used inside many WAFs)No public claim

We found no public statement from this vendor naming this CVE. That is not proof of no protection: generic rules may still catch it. CRS rarely names CVEs: it relies on generic detections. Our own lab measures what it actually blocks.